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PARTIES AND CASE COORDINATION 
The parties directly involved in this Appeal are Arco 
Electric, Inc., Petitioner ("Arco"), and the Utah State Tax 
Commission, Respondent ("Commission"). However, the appeal 
involves sales or use taxes, the responsibility for which falls 
on Granite School District ("Granite") and the Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints ("LDS Church"), arising from two separate construction 
projects. 
Because the fact situations, contract documents and 
applicable law relating to these two projects are different, two 
separate briefs on behalf of Arco have been filed, one relating 
to that portion of the assessment attributable to purchases made 
by Granite ("Granite's Brief") and the other brief relating to 
that portion of the assessment attributable to purchases made by 
the LDS Church ("LDS Church Brief"). An Amicus Curiae brief in 
support of Arco has also been filed by Brigham Young University 
("BYU Brief"). 
The Commission has filed one brief in response to the 
three briefs. Two separate reply briefs are being filed, one 
with respect to purchases made by the LDS Church and this Reply 
Brief relating to purchases made by Granite. Granite, however, 
joins in the argument set forth in the Argument portion of the 
LDS Church's Reply Brief. 
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REPLY TO COMMISSIONS STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
The Commission's Statement of the Issue is not only 
inaccurate, it assumes legal conclusions which are the very 
subject of this appeal. The statement asserts the Commission 
determined Arco Electric to be the "ultimate consumer" of the 
materials at issue. The Commission made no such determination. 
The statement concludes Arco "used" materials purchased by 
Granite for installation. The very issue before this Court is 
whether the act of installation by Arco constitutes a taxable 
"use" or event for sales and use tax purposes. Finally, the 
statement asserts the governing contract was a "furnish and 
install" contract. This characterization of the contract is 
inaccurate with respect to the materials at issue because any 
contractor obligation to furnish such materials was eliminated 
when Granite elected to purchase and furnish such materials 
itself and executed change orders to that effect. 
The statement of the issues set forth in Granite's 
Brief accurately sets forth the issues to be decided by this 
Court. 
REPLY TO COMMISSIONS STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In Granite's Brief, a detailed statement of facts was 
set forth which covered the full relationship of the parties 
including the contract provisions and their actual conduct. The 
Commission does not question, challenge or even address Granite's 
statement of facts. Rather, the Commission sets forth certain 
selected facts (mostly some contract provisions) which paint a 
<* \tc\304 ^ 
misleading picture of the relationship between and actions of the 
parties. 
For example, the Commission cites from one contract 
provision that "there was no reduction in the amount of coverage 
or any deduction for premiums for those bonds [performance and 
payment bonds] and insurance." Commission Brief 5. What the 
Commission fails to note is that this contract provision was 
between Granite and the general contractor, Broderick & Howell 
only. This provision is irrelevant to Arco (the subcontractor), 
because no bonds were required to be furnished by Arco under its 
subcontract agreement with Broderick & Howell. Stipulation of 
Facts, Exhibit C, p. 3. Further, the unrefuted evidence at the 
hearing was that Broderick & Howell received, with Granite's 
consent, a refund on the performance and payment bond premium to 
reflect the reduction in the total amount of the contract 
attributable to the amount of materials purchased by Granite. 
Tr. pp. 143, 150-151, 170. 
As another example, the Commission emphasizes one 
contract provision that imposes risk of loss to materials 
purchased by Granite on the contractor, Broderick & Howell. 
Commission Brief 4. However, the Commission fails to note that 
in reality no risk of loss was imposed on the contractor or any 
subcontractors, such as Arco, because risk of loss was fully 
covered under an insurance policy maintained by Granite. 
Findings p. 12. The only insurance provided or required of 
Broderick & Howell or Arco was general liability insurance which 
S:\tc\304 3 
did not cover risk of loss or liability with respect to materials 
purchased by Granite. Tr. pp. 4 6-47, 130-131. 
In addition, the Commission misquotes its own findings 
by stating that "the General and Supplementary Conditions [the 
primary provisions on the direct purchase procedures] between 
Granite and the contractor, Broderick & Howell, were incorporated 
into subcontract agreements between Granite and Arco by 
reference." Commission Brief 6. In reality, such Conditions 
were incorporated by reference in the subcontract agreements 
between Arco and Broderick & Howell. Findings p. 10. There were 
no contract agreements between Arco and Granite. 
Further, the unrefuted evidence at the hearing was that 
the parties considered their relationships and obligations 
different with respect to materials purchased by Granite as 
compared to materials purchased by Broderick & Howell or Arco 
even though contract provisions may have suggested otherwise. 
Tr. pp. 41, 42, 44, 49, 126, 128, 130, 131, 132, 142, 147, 168, 
176. In its statement of facts, the Commission ignores this 
evidence. 
In short, Granite asserts the facts set forth by the 
Commission do not accurately describe the relationship and 
actions of the parties, do not fully reflect the evidence or even 
the Commission's own findings and emphasize selected contract 
provisions out of context. Granite urges this Court to rely on 
the Statement of Facts in Granite's Brief in analyzing the issues 
before it. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The legislature has clearly granted Granite, a 
political subdivision of the State of Utah, an exemption from 
sales and use taxes for materials purchased and paid for by 
Granite and used in its essential governmental functions. In 
this case, the Commission has tried to change the result of this 
exemption by asserting interpretations contrary to the clear 
language of the governing statutes and its own rules. Granite 
does not seek to broaden the applicable exemption statute or 
rules, it simply seeks to receive the benefits of the exemption 
already permitted by statute and already authorized by the 
Commission's own rules. 
The correction-of-error standard of review should apply 
because this Court is as competent as the Commission to interpret 
the applicable statues and apply this Court's prior rulings to 
the straightforward facts of this case. 
The direct purchase procedures used by Granite in this 
case follow the guidance of this Court, comply with the governing 
statutes, and comply with the Commission's own rules. Because 
Granite purchased and paid for the subject materials which were 
incorporated into the schools owned by Granite, the sale of the 
materials was specifically exempt under the Commission's own 
rules (Rule 42S and Rule 58S(A)(4), infra). The Commission 
continues to ignore the clear language of these rules. 
The Commission argues that even though Arco was not the 
purchaser of the subject materials, a use tax should, 
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nevertheless, be imposed on Arco because Arco installed the 
subject materials into the school buildings and because of 
installation obligations assumed by Arco. It is clear, however, 
under decisions by this Court and the Commission's own rules, 
that the use tax does not apply to this case because the subject 
materials were purchased in Utah and because Arco was not the 
purchaser of the materials. 
ARGUMENT 
I . THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE THE 
'CORRECTION-OF-ERROR' RATHER THAN 'REASONABLENESS OR 
RATIONALITY' STANDARD. 
The focus of t h i s appeal i s on the Commission's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of ce r t a in sa les and use tax s t a t u t e s . 1 Arco, 
Granite and the LDS Church submit that the "cor rec t ion-of -er ror" 
standard of review should apply to those i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . The 
Commission a s se r t s i t has been given both express and implied 
au thor i ty to i n t e rp re t the provisions at issue and therefore , the 
"reasonableness" standard of review should apply. 
To support i t s "express author i ty" argument the 
Commission c i t e s Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987) which s t a t e s : 
The administrat ion of t h i s chapter [sales and uses 
taxes] i s vested in and sha l l be exercised by the 
Commission which may prescr ibe forms and ru les to 
conform with t h i s chapter for the making of 
xIn i t s d e c i s i o n , the Commission d i s cus se s Arco ' s l i a b i l i t y under both 
s a l e s and use t ax concepts without any c l e a r a n a l y s i s of which would apply to 
the i n s t a n t s i t u a t i o n and why. However, the Commission s a i d Arco was l i a b l e 
for "use" t a x on the m a t e r i a l a t i s s u e . Findings p . 35. As d i scussed below 
in s e c t i o n VI, the use t ax does not apply because the m a t e r i a l s a t i s s u e were 
purchased in Utah. Never the le s s , the Commission in i t s b r i e f cont inues t o 
blend and confuse s a l e s and use t ax concepts . Accordingly, Gran i te w i l l r e f e r 
t o both s a l e s and use t ax p r i n c i p l e s t o demonstrate t h a t Arco i s not l i a b l e 
for e i t h e r . 
o . \ i - < - \ 3 0 4 6 
returns and for the ascertainment, assessment, and 
collection of the taxes imposed under this 
chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-118. 
This statute focuses on the general administration of 
Utah's sales and use taxes. Nowhere in the statute is there a 
specific legislative grant of authority to interpret statutory 
terms in general or to interpret the specific statutory terms at 
issue in the case. Granite is not aware of any decision by a 
Utah appellate court which found that this statute grants the 
Commission express authority to interpret the governing statutes. 
In this Court's leading case on standard of review, 
Morton International Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State 
Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), the Court indicated 
that in order to find express authority to interpret specific 
statutory terms the grant of authority must directly refer to the 
specific terms at issue. Id. at 588.2 
In short, the Commission's argument that it has been 
granted express authority to interpret the governing statutory 
terms at issue is without merit. 
In support of its argument that it has "implied 
authority," the Commission asserts that the terms of the 
governing statutes are "broad and general," resulting in an 
2In Morton International, the statutory term "equipment" was at issue. 
The general administration statute (§ 59-12-118) was present at such time, and 
yet this Court found no "explicit grant of authority" had been granted to the 
Commission to determine what constituted "equipment." Id. at 592. 
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implied l e g i s l a t i v e grant of d i sc re t ion to i n t e r p r e t . 3 The key 
s t a t u t o r y terms in t h i s case are "purchaser,» " r e t a i l s a l e , " 
"sale" and "use." All of the terms except the term "purchaser" 
are defined by s t a t u t e . None of these terms are complex or 
technica l nor are they overly broad or general . Moreover, these 
terms have been analyzed and applied by t h i s Court to fact 
s i t u a t i o n s in several p r io r decisions and the Commission r e l i e s 
on those p r i o r cases to support i t s decision in t h i s case. 4 By 
arguing tha t the reasonableness standard appl ies to t h i s case the 
Commission i s , in essence, a lso asking t h i s Court to defer to the 
Commission's i n t e rp r e t a t i on of those p r io r cases . This Court can 
apply i t s own ru l ings to the facts of t h i s case and should give 
no deference to the Commission's i n t e rp re t a t i on of those cases . 
This Court i s jus t as well sui ted as the Commission to 
apply usual s t a tu to ry construct ion tools and i t s exper t i se to 
i n t e r p r e t the terms and provisions at i s sue . In Chris & Dick's 
Lumber & Hardware v. State Tax Commission, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 
1990), t h i s Court s t a ted tha t " [ i ]n the usual case, questions of 
s t a tu to ry construct ion are matters of law for the cour ts , and we 
r e ly on a ' co r rec t ion of e r ro r ' standard of review, according no 
3The Commission a l s o c i t e s the genera l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t a t u t e (§ 59-12-
118) as a g r a n t of implied d i s c r e t i o n t o i n t e r p r e t . I f t h i s were the case , 
the c o r r e c t i o n - o f - e r r o r s t andard would never be a v a i l a b l e with r e s pec t t o the 
review of a s a l e s or use t ax dec i s ion by the Commission. 
4The Commission c i t e s Utah Concrete Products Corp. v . S t a t e Tax 
Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), Ford J . Twaits v. Utah S t a t e 
Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944), Olson Cons t ruc t ion Company 
v. S t a t e Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961), and Tummurru 
Trades , I n c . v . Utah S t a t e Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (1990). Findings p . 
18 and Commission Brief 20. 
deference to an administrative agency's interpretation." Id. at 
513. The Court then determined that "the question of statutory 
interpretation appears to be rather straightforward and of the 
type we can easy settle by resorting to the usual tools of 
statutory construction." Id. at 514. 
The rationale of the Chris & Dick's Lumber decision has 
been affirmed at least twice by this Court in the last two years. 
In Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 
664 (Utah 1991), the Court noted that 
decisions involving statutory interpretation, 
issues of basic legislative intent, or 
construction of ordinary terms in the organic 
statute of an agency involve areas in which an 
appellate court is as well suited to decide the 
legal questions as is the agency. In cases where 
the basic question is what does the law require? 
the standard is a correction of error standard.5 
Id. at 668. 
In re jec t ing the reasonableness standard of review 
proposed by the Commission, t h i s Court s ta ted tha t 
the intermediate standard of review 
[ ' reasonableness '] i s only to be applied in areas 
of agency technical exper t ise or in areas where 
the l e g i s l a t u r e has spec i f i ca l ly granted the 
agency d i sc re t ion in i t s decision-making process. 
For most questions of basic s t a tu to ry 
i n t e rp re t a t i on or construction of the law, the 
court i s as sui ted to decide the issues involved 
as i s the agency and therefore wi l l review the 
agency decision for correctness . 
Id. (footnote omitted) 
5While the Utah Adminis t ra t ive Procedures Act ("UAPA") governed the 
Savage case , the Court was c l e a r t o po in t out t h a t the c o r r e c t i o n of e r r o r 
s t andard i s "mandated whether a r r i v e d a t under the terms of the UAPA or under 
the hold ings of our p r i o r case law." Id . a t 670. 
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Also, in the recent case of Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. 
v. State Tax Commission, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (November 12, 
1992), the issue before this Court was whether certain 
transportation charges were subject to sales tax under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-103(1) (a) or whether such charges were exempt under 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(18). The Court determined the 
correction-of-error standard should apply rather than the 
reasonableness standard proposed by the Commission. Id. 7-8 n.3. 
Because the underlying sales tax statute in Hales (§ 59-12-
103(1)(a)) is the same as in this case, the correction-of-error 
standard should also be applied in this case. 
In short, the Commission's decision in this case was 
based upon its interpretation of ordinary statutory terms and its 
interpretation of prior decisions of this Court. The 
Commission's interpretation was not based upon any technical 
expertise of the Commission6, upon the application of a complex 
technical fact situation to the statute or pursuant to a specific 
legislative grant of authority to interpret. Thus, the decision 
in this case is one which this Court is as competent as the 
Commission to decide and the correction-of-error standard should 
be applied. 
6A1though the Commission asserts it is "routinely required to determine 
what constitutes a sale" (Commission Brief 17) it does not argue it has 
special or technical expertise to interpret the key statutory terms. 
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II. THE COMMISSION FAILS TO RESPOND TO KEY ARGUMENTS OF GRANITE. 
In its Brief, Granite sets forth several arguments why 
the Commission's decision in this case should be overturned. In 
response the Commission fails to address three important 
arguments made by Granite. First, that the Commission's decision 
is contrary to one of its own rules, second, that the decision 
ignores a key requirement in one of its other rules, and third, 
that the decision is contrary to the Commission's prior practice 
and prior or companion cases dealing with the same issue. 
The first argument in Granite's Brief (pp. 24-26) is 
that the Commission has ignored its own rule in analyzing the 
facts of this case. Utah Admin. Code R865-19-42S ("Rule 42S"). 
Rule 42S provides that a sale made to a political subdivision, 
like Granite, of materials used in an essential governmental 
function is exempt from sales tax if the sale is paid for by the 
official disbursing agent. The direct purchase procedures used 
by Granite in this case specifically complied with the 
requirements of Rule 42S. Granite's reliance upon Rule 42S in 
its direct purchase procedures over several years is evidenced by 
its reference to Rule 42S on the purchase orders used in the 
construction of the school buildings. Curiously, the Commission 
continues to ignore Rule 42S and in fact, makes no response to it 
at all in its brief. If the Commission no longer believes Rule 
42S is valid or does not mean what it says, the Commission should 
take appropriate rulemaking or legislative steps to repeal or 
modify it. 
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Another argument in Grani te ' s Brief (pp. 27-28) i s that 
a careful reading of the Commission's own i:ule in Utah Admin. 
Code R865-19-58S(A)(1) ("Rule 58S(A)(1)») s t a t e s tha t in order 
for a cont rac tor or i n s t a l l e r , l ike Arco, to be a taxable 
consumer of mater ia ls for sa les tax purposes, i t must a lso be the 
owner of the mate r i a l s . The findings of fact and unrefuted 
evidence presented at formal hearing show that Arco was not the 
owner of the mate r i a l s . The Commission continues to c i t e and 
re fe r to Rule 58S(A)(1) as if no ownership requirement i s 
necessary. 
The Commission further f a i l s to respond to Gran i t e ' s 
argument tha t i t s decision i s inconsis tent with i t s p r i o r 
p rac t i ce s and p r io r or companion exemption cases . As noted in 
Gran i t e ' s Brief, the d i rec t purchase procedures followed by 
Granite and other tax-exempt e n t i t i e s have been successful ly used 
for several years . In addi t ion, the governing contract language 
and fac ts in both Home Construction Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission, Appeal No. 85-0118 (November 27, 1987), and Layton 
Construction Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal No. 86-0650 
(March 9, 1992), are v i r t u a l l y iden t i ca l to tha t in Gran i te ' s 
por t ion of t h i s case.7 However, in those cases the Commission 
held the d i r ec t purchases by the tax-exempt e n t i t i e s were exempt 
from sa les and use taxes . Also, as set forth in d e t a i l in the 
7The c o n t r a c t p rov i s i on involv ing the d i r e c t purchases of m a t e r i a l s in 
Home were not incorpora ted i n t o the Home dec i s ion a t t a ched as Addendum C to 
G r a n i t e ' s Br ie f . The d i r e c t purchase c o n t r a c t p r o v i s i o n s in Home a re 
a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as Addendum 1 and a re almost verbat im t o those in t h i s c a se . 
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LDS Church Brief, the conclusions of law issued by the Commission 
are internally contradictory and inconsistent and offer confusing 
direction to taxpayers and tax-exempt entities, as well. 
In its brief, the Commission offers no explanation for 
these differences. 
III. THE ACT OF INSTALLATION OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TO 
REAL PROPERTY BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE PURCHASER OF THE 
MATERIALS IS NOT A TAXABLE EVENT. 
It is undisputed that Arco installed or physically 
attached the materials at issue into the two elementary school 
buildings. The Commission ruled that such act of installation 
constituted a taxable event. Findings, p. 28. In its brief, the 
Commission asserts that its decision hinges on the following 
conclusions of law reached by it: "(1) Sales of materials for 
use in construction, improvement, alteration or repair of real 
property for a government entity or religious institution are not 
exempt (Decision and Order R. 85-86). (2) To be exempt, the sale 
must be directly to the government entity, religious institution 
or charitable organization for the use of and consumption by the 
exempt entity." Id., Commission Brief 19 (emphasis in original). 
The Commission then cites the following three cases 
from this Court in support of its conclusions of law and its 
determination that the subcontractor in this case, Arco, (rather 
than the general contractor Broderick & Howell or the owner and 
purchaser, Granite) was responsible for Utah use tax on the 
materials. Utah Concrete Prods. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 
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Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), Ford J. Twaits Co, v. Utah Staf.P 
Tax Comm'n, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944); and Tummurru 
Trades v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990) . 
The Commission misapplies the holdings in each of these 
cases to the facts of this case. In Utah Concrete, Twaits and 
Tummurru, the contractor involved purchased and paid for the 
materials on his own account and then installed the materials 
into real property. The Court appropriately determined that the 
contractor in each of the cases was the purchaser and consumer of 
the materials at issue. In this case, the materials at issue 
were purchased and paid for by Granite. Unlike the contractors 
in Utah Concrete, Tummurru and Twaits, vendors looked solely to a 
tax-exempt entity--in this case Granite--for payment of the 
materials purchased by Granite and title to the materials passed 
directly to Granite without any vesting in Arco or Broderick & 
Howell. 
In short, the contractors in Utah Concrete, Tummurru, 
and Twaits were deemed to be the taxable consumers of the 
materials at issue for sales tax purposes because the contractors 
were also the purchasers of the materials. This purchaser 
requirement has been reaffirmed by this Court in the recent case 
of Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax Commission, 196 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18 (September 30, 1992). The Court stated: 
one who purchases building materials for use 
in constructing homes, highways and the like, 
is a 'real property contractor,' and the 
contractor's purchase of tangible personal 
property used for such purposes are taxable 
transactions under the sales tax law. In 
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effect, a real property contractor is treated 
as a consumer for sales tax purposes. 
Id. 19-20 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
In other words, the focus of the inquiry should be on 
the purchase of the materials and not on the installation of the 
materials. In this case Granite, not Arco, was the purchaser of 
the materials at issue. Granite paid for the materials. The 
suppliers looked solely to Granite for payment. Title to the 
materials passed directly from the suppliers to Granite. 
Of particular significance to this case, the Court in 
Twaits noted that the contract granted the government the right 
to issue tax exempt certificates to avoid the imposition of sales 
or use tax on the materials purchased. No such certificates were 
issued, however, and the Court concluded that the contractor was 
liable for sales or use taxes on materials purchased. The Court 
stated: 
[i]t is apparent that the government did not 
intend in the instant case to exempt plaintiff 
[the contractor] from local taxes. Had it so 
intended, it would have been a simple matter to 
authorize plaintiff to buy as an agent of the 
government, to issue a tax exemption referred to 
in Article 31 of the contract, or otherwise 
declare the goods government property. 
Ford, 148 P.2d at 344-45. In other words, the U.S. Government 
chose not to exercise its right to purchase materials directly 
and thereby qualify for the exemption from sales and use taxes. 
In this case, Granite elected to exercise a similar right to 
purchase materials directly and thereby qualify for the 
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exemption. The direct purchase procedures utilized by Granite in 
this case follow the guidance of this Court.8 
IV. THE COMMISSION ARGUES FOR A NEW INTERPRETATION OF RULE 
58S(A) (4) WHICH IS CONTRARY TO ITS CLEAR LANGUAGE. 
In its brief, the Commission argues for a new 
interpretation of Rule 58S(A)(4), which provides: 
Sales of materials to religious or charitable 
institutions and government agencies are exempt 
only if sold as tangible personal property and the 
seller does not install the materials as an 
improvement to realty or use it to repair real 
property. 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-58S(A)(4) (emphasis added). 
In this case none of the materials at issue were 
purchased by Granite from vendors or suppliers who also installed 
them and therefore the purchases should be exempt. Despite the 
clear language of Rule 58S(A)(4), the Commission asserts for the 
first time in these proceedings that the 'correct' interpretation 
of Rule 58S(A)(4) is that materials sold to a tax exempt entity 
are exempt only if they are installed in the real property by the 
tax-exempt entity. Commission Brief 23. Not only does this 
interpretation violate the clear language of the rule, it is also 
an example of how far the Commission's efforts in this case have 
strayed from underlying legislative and administrative intent. 
If the Commission no longer believes Rule 58(A)(4) means what it 
says or does not like the results of its application, it should 
8In Utah Concrete, supra, this Court also stated that if the materials 
at issue had been purchased by the governmental entity or by its agent, no 
sales tax would have been owing. 12 5 P.2d at 411. 
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take appropriate rulemaking or legislative steps to repeal or 
modify it. 
V. REVERSING THE TAX COURT DECISION IN THIS CASE DOES NOT 
RESULT IN THE BROADENING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL EXEMPTION. 
In its brief, the Commission cites the case of Parson 
Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 
(Utah 1980) for the proposition that parties seeking exemption 
from the imposition of tax bear the burden of proving their 
eligibility for that exemption. While this may be a true 
characterization of this Court's statement in Parson, the correct 
focus in this case is not on whether Granite is eligible for a 
tax exemption, but rather, which party (Granite or Arco) was the 
purchaser of the materials at issue. That determination should 
be made based on the guidelines established by this Court as 
summarized in Granite's Brief, namely, giving the benefit of the 
doubt to the party against whom the Commission seeks to impose a 
tax. See Granite Brief at 31.) There has been no claim in this 
case that Granite was not entitled to an exemption as long as the 
sale of the materials was made "to" it. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104 (2) (1992) . 
In short, Granite does not seek any broadening of the 
governmental exemption statute. It simply seeks to receive the 
benefits of the exemption already permitted by statute and 
already authorized by the Commission's own rules. 
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VI. THERE IS NO AUTHORITY FOR IMPOSITION OF USE TAX AGAINST A 
CONTRACTOR WHO INSTALLS PERSONAL PROPERTY PURCHASED BY A 
TAX-EXEMPT OWNER. 
In its brief, the Commission argues that even if the 
purchases of the materials made by Granite are exempt from the 
sales tax, a use tax should nevertheless be imposed on Arco 
because Arco's installation of the materials constituted a 
taxable use, As authority for this position the Commission cites 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(1) which provides that »[t]here is 
levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
. . . tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in 
this state."9 Utah Code Ann § 59-12-103 (1) (1) (1992). Section 
59-12-102(14) (a) defines "use" as the exercise of any right or 
power over tangible personal property "incident to the ownership 
or the leasing of that property, item, or service." Id. § 59-12-
102(14)(a) (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the assertions of the Commission in its 
brief, this Court has consistently held that the use tax applies 
only to property whose title was transferred outside of Utah 
which was subsequently used in Utah as defined in the statute. 
Utah Concrete Prods. Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 
513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942); Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 110 Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164 (1946), modified bv 110 Utah 
9The separate use and sales tax acts were consolidated in 1987 by the 
Unified Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. Current Section 59-12-103(1)(1) merely 
restates Section 59-16-3(a) of the old use tax act which technically applies to 
this case because the subject transactions occurred prior to the consolidation. 
However, the substance of the two sections is the same. 
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152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947); Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949).10 
In this case there has been no allegation or claim that 
the materials at issue were purchased outside of Utah. 
In its brief, the Commission suggests that the 
consolidation of the separate sales and use tax acts in 1987 
modified the above noted historical and case law distinction 
between the sales and use tax components of the Unified Utah 
Sales and Use Tax Act. Such argument is without merit. In the 
first place, even if a modification occurred with the 
consolidation, it would not affect this case because the 
assessment period at issue occurred prior to such consolidation 
(i.e. the audit period was from January 1, 1982 to March 31, 
1987). Secondly, the sales and use tax distinction has been 
reaffirmed by this Court after the consolidation and the 
Commission's own rules continue to maintain the distinction. 
In the recent case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (November 6, 
1992), this Court addressed the relationship between the sales 
and use tax and stated: 
[t]he sales tax imposes a transaction tax on 
certain sales and certain services that occur in 
Utah. Complementing the sales tax, the use tax 
imposes an excise tax on tangible property and 
certain services performed in connection with that 
property, where the property is stored or used in 
Utah but is not subject to Utah sales tax because 
10Section 59-12-102(14)(a) also deals with leases, but leases are not 
relevant because none are present in this case. 
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it was purchased or the service was performed 
outside of Utah. 
Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
This distinction between the sales and use tax 
components of the Utah State and Use Tax Act is also set forth in 
the Commission's own rule.11 
Moreover, the definition of "use" in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-102(14) (a) provides that there can be no taxable use of 
property absent ownership of the property by the person whose use 
invokes the tax. Olson Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 
2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961); Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990). Because Arco was not the 
purchaser or owner of the materials, any "use" by it with respect 
to the installation of the materials is not taxable. 
In short, no use tax can apply to property purchased in 
Utah and used, stored or consumed in this state. Any such 
transaction is either subject to the sales tax or is not taxable. 
A purchase exempt from sales tax is also exempt from use tax. 
Hardy v. State Tax Comm'n, 561 P.2d 1064, 1070 (Utah 1977). Thus, 
the Commission's use tax argument is not supported by statute, 
case law, or its own rules. 
lxUtah Admin. Code R865-19-1S provides that "if the sale is made in Utah, 
the sales tax applies. If the sale is made elsewhere, the use tax applies." 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-1SD. 
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VII. ARCO'S STORAGE AND OTHER INSTALLATION RESPONSIBILITIES WITH 
RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT MATERIALS DOES NOT RESULT IN A SALES 
OR USE TAXABLE EVENT, 
As noted above, the primary argument set forth by the 
Commission in its brief is that the installation of the materials 
at issue by Arco into Granite's school building facilities 
constitutes a taxable event for use tax purposes. In a different 
twist to this same argument, the Commission also asserts that 
Arco's storage of the materials and its installation obligations 
with respect to the materials constitutes a taxable use "incident 
to ownership." The Commission cites Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
103(1) (1) and Interwest Aviation v. County Board of Equalization, 
743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987), as authority for this argument. 
The inappropriate application of Utah Code Ann. § 59-
12-103(1)(1) to this case has already been explained in Section 
VI (page 18) of this brief above. 
The inappropriate application of Interwest to this case 
is adequately discussed in the LDS Church Reply Brief. As noted 
in such Brief, if the incidents of ownership criteria set forth 
by the Court in Interwest is applied to this case, it would 
indicate ownership of the material in Granite and/or the LDS 
Church• 
Not only did Granite possess the "incidents of 
ownership" noted by this Court in Interwest but if also held the 
most signifies' - .-:::;^  and burdens of ownership with 
respect to the materials at issue. (See Granite's brief at pages 
36-39 for a detailed list of such benefi ts and burdens of 
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ownership.) Despite this long list of benefits and burdens of 
ownership possessed by Granite, the Commission still asserts that 
Arco held the most significant attributes of ownership and 
further misstates Arco's role in the direct purchase procedures 
and mischaracterizes several contract provisions to support this 
assertion. 
On page twenty-nine of its brief, the Commission states 
that "Arco negotiated and administered the purchase." Actually, 
while Broderick & Howell received supplier information from Arco, 
it was Broderick & Howell and not Arco, pursuant to contract and 
actual practice, which assisted Granite in the negotiation and 
administration of the purchase of materials by Granite. Findings 
p. 9; Tr. p. 125. 
Again on page twenty-nine of its brief, the Commission 
states that Arco "received, inspected and stored the property." 
It is true that Arco participated in these activities pursuant to 
its subcontract agreement with Broderick & Howell but the primary 
responsibility for these activities rested with Broderick & 
Howell. Tr. p. 81, 125, 172-174. Further, these activities 
would be typical of a contractor or installer in any installation 
activity. Granite also inspected and tested materials. Tr. 
p. 172-174. 
Also on page twenty-nine of its brief, the Commission 
asserts that the "risk of loss, damage, theft, vandalism or 
destruction" of materials purchased by Granite was placed on 
Arco. Actually such contractual obligation rested with Broderick 
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& Howell. Findings p. 9. Further, the Commission fails to note 
that in reality no risk of loss to the materials was imposed on 
Broderick & Howell (or Arco for that matter) because such risk of 
loss was fully covered under an insurance policy purchased and 
maintained by Granite. Findings p. 12. 
On page twenty-nine of its brief, the Commission states 
Arco was responsible to hold Granite harmless from any "loss, 
claim, defect, discrepancy, delay and delivery or any problem" 
regarding the materials. Actually, this contractual obligation 
was between Granite and Broderick & Howell (Findings p. 9), and 
the actual relationship and actions of the parties with respect 
to the materials purchased directly by Granite and problems 
relating to such materials varied from the contract provisions. 
(These differences are set forth in detail in Granite's Brief 
starting at page 14.) 
The essence of Arco's involvement in this case was as 
installer of materials purchased by Granite. Arco also shared 
with Broderick & Howell agency responsibilities in identifying 
suppliers of materials and receiving such materials prior to 
installation. The assumption by Arco of such bailee 
responsibilities does not nuke Arco the deemed purchaser or owner 
of the materials.12 When all of the facts and circumstances are 
examined, the preponderance of the benefits and burdens of 
In fact, if the basis of the assessment in this case is the above 
quoted contract provisions, the assessment should have been made against 
Broderick & Howell, instead of Arco, because such contract provisions were 
imposed on Broderick & Howell 
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ownership of the materials remained with Granite. Granite was 
the real owner, purchaser and ultimate consumer of the materials. 
VIII. THE EXECUTION OF CHANGE ORDERS MODIFIED THE CONTRACT WITH 
RESPECT TO MATERIALS PURCHASED BY GRANITE. 
The Commission cites the following contract provision 
between Granite and Broderick & Howell to argue that the 
execution of change orders to the contract did not alter the 
duties of the parties or change the relationship of the parties 
with respect to the materials purchased by Granite: 
These provisions for direct purchase by Board 
[Granite] of materials and equipment shall 
not relieve the Contractor [Broderick & 
Howell] of any of its duties or obligations 
under the contract or constitute a waiver of 
[Granite's] right to absolute fulfillment of 
all of the terms hereof. 
Findings, pp. 9-10. The Commission presents no facts or case law 
in support of this assertion.13 
As set forth in Granite's Brief, however, the unrefuted 
evidence at the formal hearing was that when Granite exercised 
its right to purchase materials directly, a change order to the 
contract was executed and the change order had the effect of an 
amendment to the contract removing the amount of the directly 
purchased materials from the contract and changing the nature of 
the contract. Tr. p. 107-108, 127, 134. In addition, the 
relationship of the parties changed significantly with respect to 
such directly purchased materials. Tr. pp. 41, 42, 44, 49, 126, 
130f particular interest to this case is the fact that this same 
contract provision was present in Home. See section 15.1.6 of the Home 
contract attached as Addendum 1. See also Granite's Brief pp. 40-44. 
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128, 130, 131, 132, 142, 147, 168, 176.14 In essence, the 
contract became an installation only contract with respect to 
those materials purchased by Granite. The Contractor, Broderick 
& Howell, was not relieved of any of its contractual duties or 
obligations with respect to materials not elected to be purchased 
by Granite. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the correction-of-error 
standard should be applied to this review and this Court should 
determine that Granite was the true purchaser, owner and ultimate 
consumer of the materials at issue. The installation of the 
materials by Arco was not a sales or use taxable event and the 
assessment against Arco was improper. 
DATED this /Sri day of January, 1993. 
/A^ ^^iS>— 
Thomas Christensen, Jr. 
John E. S. Robson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Arco & Granite 
14, Such relationship changes are set forth in detail in Granite's Brief 
and the legal effect of the change orders are discussed at length in BYU's 
Brief. 
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A D D E N D U M 1 
ARTICLE 15 
DIRECT PURCHASE OF MATERIAL BY THE OWNER 
15.1 FURNISHING OF MATERIALS THROUGH DIRECT PURCHASE Bi 1HE OWNER 
15*1« 1 The Owner shall have the r ight to furnish any part or all of the 
materials and equipment which shall become a par t of the permanent structure,., 
15* 1.2 1 he Contractor" shall i negotiate and admin is tei all such direct purchases 
by the Owner, and shall furnish to the Owner a description, source of supply, 
trade discount information, and other information necessary to enable the Owner 
to purchase directly any such materials and equipment. Purchases by the Owner 
shall be made on requisition or purchase orders furnished by the Owner and signed 
by the duly authorized purchasing agent of the Owner. Title to all such mate-
rials and equipment purchased by the Owner shall pass from the vendor directly to 
the Owner upon delivery to the job site, without any vesting in the Contractor. 
After delivery, the risk of loss, damage, theft, vandalism, or destruction of or 
to any such materials and equipment purchased directly by the Owner shall lie 
with the Contractor, 
15*1.3 Storage of any materials and equipment fun ushed by the Owner shall be 
the responsibility of the Contractor. The Contractor shall hold the Owner harm-
less of and from any failure of the suppliers of materials or equipment so pur-
chased by the Owner resulting in any loss, claim, defect, discrepancy, delay in 
de1 Ivery, or any prob1 em i i i re1 a ti ng to such ma teri a 1s or equ i pmen t. 
15.1.4 1 he Contractor shall acknowledge receipt and approval of any such mate-
rials or equipment purchased directly by the Owner by signing the invoice for any 
such materials or equipment. The Owner will make payment for any such materials 
or equipment within a reasonable time after the receipt of the signed invoice 
from the Contractor. 
15.1.5 The Owner shall not be responsible for the loss of a prompt payment dis-
count from the purchase price if the Owner makes payment (determined by the date 
of mailing of the check for payment) within ten business days following the 
receipt by the Owner of the signed invoice from the Contractor, 
15*1.6 The Contract Sum shall be reduced by the amount actually paid by the 
Owner for such materials and equipment furnished by the Owner and by the sales 
tax which would have been paid on such materials and equipment had they been 
supplied by the Contractor. Similarly, the amount of any Progress Payment pro-
vided for the above shall be adjusted to reflect the direct purchase of any such 
materials and equipment by the Owner, The Owner shall not be responsible for the 
loss of or reduction in any trade discounts available to the Contractor as a 
result of any purchases made by the Owner. 
All bonds and insurance shall remain in full force,. There shall be no 
reduction in the amount of coverage or any deduction for premiums for said bonds 
and insurance. These provisions for direct purchase by the Owner of materials 
and equipment shall not relieve the Contractoi of any of its duties or obliga-
tions under the Contract or constitute a waiver of the Owner's right to absolute 
fulfillment of all the terms hereof. 
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